The Gulf crisis between Qatar and three of its Gulf neighbors, which started in June 2017 and ended in January 2021 with the signing of the Al-Ula Declaration in Saudi Arabia, had a transformative impact on Turkey’s relations with all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Although the GCC states share some common regional concerns, they at the same time also diverge in their foreign policies. In addition to their differing perspectives toward relations with Iran or Israel, Turkey was also a point of divergence within GCC dynamics over the past decade. This divergence led to the emergence of blocs within the GCC, including the Saudi Arabia/United Arab Emirates bloc in which Bahrain was also a part.
While Ankara’s relations with the Saudi/Emirati bloc or Qatar have been the subject of numerous analyses both in academia and media, its relations with Bahrain – which is seeking to improve its ties with Ankara – have not been given much attention. This week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to visit Bahrain, for the first time since February 2017, months before the Gulf rift erupted. After Bahrain, he is scheduled to stop in Qatar to attend the opening match of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. This potential new chapter in Turkish-Bahraini relations is worth exploring, especially as Bahrain’s ties with Qatar remain strained – there are still no direct flights or ambassadors in either capital nearly two years after the Al-Ula agreement officially ended the Gulf rift.
A Quick Review of Turkey-Bahrain Relations
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Bahrain in 1973, the relationship between the two countries has followed a stable path. But when compared to Turkey’s relations with the other GCC states, relations with Bahrain never significantly developed. Turkey opened its embassy in Manama in 1990, while Bahrain opened its embassy in Ankara in 2008, quite late when compared to other GCC countries. However, in recent years, Turkey and Bahrain started to improve ties, particularly in 2016 and 2017.
In August 2016, Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa was the first Arab leader to visit Ankara following the July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. The Bahraini king’s visit was so deeply appreciated in Ankara that Erdogan chose Bahrain as the first leg of his three-country Gulf tour in February 2017. In his visit to Manama, he said: “Supporting us in our toughest days, you gained a unique place in our heart.” He continued, “Turkey will continue to stand by Bahrain in its good and bad days. I am of the belief that we will carry on joining forces for the peace, stability, and future of our region.”
During the respective visits of King Hamad to Ankara in 2016 and Erdogan to Manama in 2017, numerous agreements were signed on defense, diplomatic, educational, and economic cooperation. The two leaders signed a memorandum of understanding on defense industry cooperation. The agreement followed an August 2012 military training cooperation agreement, which was inked at a time when Ankara was signing similar deals with other GCC countries that sought to benefit from its military experience and defense capabilities. There was also increased participation by Turkish defense companies in the 2017 Bahrain International Airshow.
Qatar Boycott Impacts Bahrain-Turkey Relationship
The developing relations between Ankara and Manama were adversely impacted by Bahrain’s decision to join Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt in imposing a boycott on Qatar in 2017. While Turkey stood with Qatar, Bahrain aligned its policies with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Unlike its neighbors, Bahrain is not a state that pursues a brash foreign policy. The archipelago kingdom, which is one of the Middle East’s sectarian flashpoints, considers itself increasingly vulnerable to regional challenges. It is a small state surrounded by middle-power neighbors with ideological or irredentist and expansionist foreign policy aims. Stuck between the intra-Gulf divisions and broader Saudi-Iranian rivalry, Bahrain has allied with Saudi Arabia during several regional events, such as the disputes with Qatar in 2014 and 2017 and the severing of relations with Iran in 2016. Indeed, among the GCC members, no country relies on Saudi Arabia as much as Bahrain.
Given those realities, Turkish-Bahraini relations cannot be fully understood without taking into account the Saudi dimension. It was not solely Bahrain’s domestic or external drivers but also Saudi dynamics that influenced the status of Manama’s relations with Ankara. Small states like Bahrain are not only subjected to internal pressures but also external demands from stronger states, which can have as great or sometimes an even greater effect on their behavior. One of the ways that small states deal with the pressures of the stronger states is to bandwagon with them. Bahrain’s strategy, however, seemed to be more of a defensive bandwagon rather than an offensive one. It was not against Turkey in the sense that it perceived a threat from the country itself but was more about deferring to the demands of its assertive neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia, which provides economic, political, and security assistance to Bahrain. International relations scholars have argued that small and weak states – such as Bahrain – prefer not to bandwagon, but they are often forced to do so due to their vulnerable positions.
In addition to the Saudi dimension, this strategy was also motivated by long-standing Bahrain-Qatar tensions. This could be one of the reasons why there is still no significant rapprochement between Qatar and Bahrain since the Al-Ula Declaration. And Bahrain was the last Gulf country to open its airspace to Qatar following the end of the diplomatic crisis.
A Modus Vivendi: Steps Toward Normalization
In the initial weeks of the Gulf rift, Turkey tried to maintain relations with Bahrain. In June 2017, Erdogan and King Hamad had a phone call to discuss common concerns regarding the Gulf crisis. A few days later, Bahrain’s foreign minister visited Ankara to meet Erdogan.
However, these attempts didn’t bear much fruit. Moreover, Turkish-Bahraini relations were tested after Manama signed the Abraham Accords that normalized its relations with Israel. Turkey strongly condemned Bahrain’s decision, saying that it contradicted the commitments made under the Arab Peace Initiative and by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. However, at the same time, Ankara continued to pursue diplomacy. In November 2020, Erdogan offered condolences to King Hamad after the death of the Gulf country’s long-serving prime minister, the king’s uncle.
Contacts between Ankara and Manama have multiplied since then. After assuming her new post in March 2021, Turkish Ambassador to Bahrain Esin Cakil held several meetings with Bahraini officials, including the foreign, health, labor, and social development ministers. In September 2021, she met King Hamad, who hailed Turkish-Bahraini ties and described their relations as between “two brotherly countries.” Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also met with his Bahraini counterpart, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. “We will build on the positive momentum we have recently reached in our relations,” he tweeted. Cavusoglu’s followed up on this meeting with an official two-day visit to Bahrain in January upon the invitation of Al Zayani.
Diplomatic contacts also increased in the economic field. In March, Turkey’s finance minister, Nureddin Nebati, visited Manama for a meeting of the Bahraini-Turkish Joint Committee. Nebati and his Bahraini counterpart stressed the importance of continuing efforts to boost cooperation between both countries in the financial, economic, trade, investment, and development fields. The countries signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation on standardization, and Bahrain granted Turkey the status of “authorized partner” for the International Center for Sea and Air Freight Services in the kingdom, aiming to develop links with various economic sectors.
Future Prospects
2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Bahrain. During his visit to Bahrain, Cavusoglu said “We should make sure that the year 2023 becomes a true milestone in our bilateral cooperation.”
For Bahrain, it has become critical to diversify its partnerships with regional powers, especially in defense and trade. Over the past few years, Turkey’s defense industry has increased its sales to Gulf countries, so this might be an area for Bahrain to deepen cooperation with Turkey. Although the trade volume between Turkey and Bahrain does not compare to that of other Gulf countries, there is an opportunity for Ankara to reach new sources of energy, hydrocarbons and renewables, through its ties to Bahrain, while Manama can also attract Turkish investments.
Despite the relatively undeveloped level of economic ties, there are significant security aspects to the Turkish-Bahraini relationship. Bahrain, like other GCC members, might seek to deepen its ties with Turkey, as it perceives a rising hegemonic Iran, increasing risks of terrorism, and the potential for destabilizing fallout from great power competition as significant threats to its stability and security. For Turkey, increasing its number of friends in the Gulf is crucial, especially as its economy deteriorates and the country approaches elections in 2023.
