Senior Resident Scholar, AGSIW
Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. He is a weekly columnist for The National (UAE), former columnist for Bloomberg, regular contributor to The Atlantic and The Daily Beast, and frequent contributor to many other U.S. and Middle Eastern publications. He has made thousands of radio and television appearances and was the Washington, DC correspondent for the Daily Star (Beirut). Many of Ibish’s articles are archived on his Ibishblog website.
His most recent book is What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda? Why Ending the Occupation and Peace with Israel is Still the Palestinian National Goal (ATFP, 2009). Ibish was included in all three years (2011, 2012, and 2013) of Foreign Policy’s “Twitterati 100,” the magazine’s list of 100 “must-follow” Twitter feeds on foreign policy.
Ibish is the editor and principal author of three major studies of Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab Americans 1998-2000 (ADC, 2001), Sept. 11, 2001-Oct. 11, 2002 (ADC, 2003), and 2003-2007 (ADC, 2008). He is also the author of “At the Constitution’s Edge: Arab Americans and Civil Liberties in the United States” in States of Confinement (St. Martin’s Press, 2000), “Anti-Arab Bias in American Policy and Discourse” in Race in 21st Century America (Michigan State University Press, 2001), “Race and the War on Terror,” in Race and Human Rights (Michigan State University Press, 2005) and “Symptoms of Alienation: How Arab and American Media View Each Other“ in Arab Media in the Information Age (ECSSR, 2005). He wrote, along with Ali Abunimah, “The Palestinian Right of Return” (ADC, 2001) and “The Media and the New Intifada” in The New Intifada (Verso, 2001). He is the editor, along with Saliba Sarsar, of Principles and Pragmatism (ATFP, 2006).
Ibish previously served as a senior fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine, and executive director of the Hala Salaam Maksoud Foundation for Arab-American Leadership from 2004-09. From 1998-2004, Ibish served as communications director for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. He has a PhD in comparative literature from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
The map of Syria has undergone a shocking revision, and domestic instability and retribution, with broader regional fallout, remain possible, even as diplomats engage and hope for the best.
On December 10, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the future U.S.-Gulf relations under the incoming Trump administration.
Trump’s unrealized quest to craft a major international agreement presents significant potential opportunities for Riyadh.
Gulf Arab states are yet again watching on the sidelines as other powers shape their present and future strategic environment.
GCC states will see advantages and disadvantages from either outcome in the U.S. presidential election but will rely on the persistence of long-standing ties.
On October 3, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the repercussions of Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah.
On October 9, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the U.S. presidential election and what it means for U.S.-Middle East policy.
On September 26, AGSIW and ROPES co-hosted a discussion on rising tensions in the Middle East.
On July 17, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the conflict at the Lebanese-Israeli border.
On July 11, AGSIW hosted a discussion on Iran's presidential election.
On June 14, AGSIW hosted a discussion on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
On May 28, AGSIW hosted a discussion on security politics in the Gulf.
On June 11, AGSIW convened its 10th annual Petro Diplomacy conference.
On March 12, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the Houthi challenge to maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
On February 20, AGSIW hosted a panel discussion examining Israel's foreign and domestic policy since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict.
On February 6, AGSIW hosted a panel discussion on U.S. policy in the Middle East.
AGSIW experts explain the regional trends they’ll be following most closely as the year unfolds.
On January 9, AGSIW hosted a virtual roundtable with its leadership and scholars as they looked ahead and assessed trends likely to shape the Gulf region and U.S. foreign policy during the coming year.
Israel might try to kill Hamas leaders in Qatar, leave them alone, or even use them to help craft a postconflict order in Gaza.
On November 7, AGSIW hosted a discussion on Gulf responses to the Israel-Hamas conflict.
On October 26, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the prospects for the end of the conflict in Yemen.
Washington and Riyadh will be watching the next steps before reassessing the potential for a triangular agreement with Israel.
On October 12, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the Israel-Hamas conflict.
On September 7, AGSIW hosted a discussion of a book that examines Gulf Arab states' military strategies.
On August 30, AGSIW and ROPES co-hosted a discussion on the prospects for an agreement among the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
Israel may at last be incapable of taking yes for an answer, even from the most influential Arab and Muslim country.
On August 3, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the push for a grand bargain between Israel and Saudi Arabia brokered by the United States.
On July 25, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the United Arab Emirates' transformation after the Arab Spring.
On June 27 and 28, AGSIW convened its ninth annual Petro Diplomacy conference.
On June 15, AGSIW hosted a discussion on Israel's relations with the Arab world.
On June 1, AGSIW and the Middle East Institute co-hosted a discussion on Turkey's presidential election results.
AGSIW experts explain the regional trends they’ll be following most closely as the year unfolds.
AGSIW hosted a virtual private roundtable with its leadership and scholars as they looked ahead and assessed trends likely to shape the Gulf region and U.S. foreign policy during the coming year.
Saudi Arabia’s expanding relationship with China signals its attempts to emerge as a mid-level international power, but that shouldn't threaten the partnership with Washington.
On December 7, AGSIW hosted a conversation with Kim Ghattas, host of the new podcast "People Like Us."
AGSIW convened the 2022 UAE Security Forum on November 17, where U.S., UAE, and regional partners gathered to find creative solutions to some of the region’s most pressing challenges.
On October 20 and 21, AGSIW convened its eighth annual Petro Diplomacy conference.
Lack of trust has left Washington and Riyadh misreading each other's intentions to the point of creating a crisis where none should have ever existed.
On October 4, AGSIW hosted a conversation with Jon Alterman, author of the recent essay "The Middle East's Coming Centrality."
On September 22, AGSIW hosted a discussion on political succession in Iran.
On September 14, AGSIW hosted a discussion with Walter Russell Mead on his new book and current U.S. policy in the Middle East.
A new EU proposal, embraced by the United States, gives Iran a last chance, but Tehran seems fixated on using it to shut down the IAEA investigation.
The U.S. president didn't return from the region with a long checklist of accomplishments, but he didn't go with a checklist of ambitions.
On July 19, AGSIW hosted a discussion examining President Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s visit to Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, and Saudi Arabia and considering implications for relations with the United States' partners in the region.
On Tuesday June 21, AGSIW hosted a discussion on President Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s planned visit to Saudi Arabia and implications for U.S.-Saudi relations.
Having found success in reviving the Western alliance after the invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration is seeking a stronger coalition in the Middle East.
Iraq’s criminalization of relations with Israel may be domestic political maneuvering, but it could come at a heavy cost for several constituencies.
“International and Regional Involvement in the Middle East" is a bimonthly workshop series launched in September 2021, co-hosted by AGSIW and the University of Haifa.
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE sought to protect ties with Moscow and strategic diversification but underestimated the cost.
On March 1, AGSIW hosted a discussion examining challenges and threats to regional de-escalation and rapprochement.
With the Muslim Brotherhood movement in seemingly chronic decline, the "bully" and the "upstart" find new avenues of cooperation.
Houthi missile attacks on the UAE and U.S. military facilities expose a fragile Middle East calm.
AGSIW experts explain the regional trends they’ll be following most closely as the year unfolds.
AGSIW hosted a session as part of Gulf Intelligence’s Global UAE Energy Forum 2022: “What’s in Store for the Gulf Region in 2022?”
AGSIW's leadership and scholars assessed trends likely to shape the Gulf region and U.S. foreign policy in 2022.
From December 7-9, UAESF 2021 assessed geopolitical trends in the region.
Saudi Arabia and its allies are pressuring Lebanon to gain leverage in Syria and Yemen.
A year after the signing of the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia remains poised between joining the accords or deciding it is not worth the many risks involved.
The 9/11 attacks reshaped Gulf Arab perceptions of terrorism and Islamism, of each other, and of strategic relations with Tehran and Washington.
Maximalist proposals calling for near-total withdrawal or expanding the U.S. military footprint are unrealistic. The task is to find effective ways of doing as much, or more, with less.
Long-standing but underappreciated differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia are becoming more obvious, but their continuing shared interests remain decisive.
On July 8, AGSIW hosted a private briefing on the developing OPEC+ dispute and the repercussions for the future of the alliance as well as Saudi-UAE relations.
With its presidential election over, Iran may now want an agreement, but the biggest issues may remain untouchable.
On June 16, AGSIW hosted a discussion on the ongoing Vienna negotiations aimed at reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement.
On May 17, AGSIW hosted a discussion examining the Biden administration's efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal.
An Israeli-Hamas conflict is far more manageable than Al-Aqsa confrontations.
New talks reflect a broad range of regional and international developments in recent years.
Friend and foe have been informed that Biden won’t accept what Obama and Trump might have.
AGSIW hosted Athol Yates for a discussion of his book exploring the history of the UAE’s armed forces.
AGSIW hosted a virtual private roundtable with its leadership and scholars as they looked ahead to assess trends likely to shape the Gulf region during the coming year.
On January 21, AGSIW hosted a virtual roundtable on the future of U.S. arms sales to the Gulf.
AGSIW experts explain what regional trends they’ll be following most closely as the year unfolds.
Almost all sides are winners for now, but a third GCC confrontation remains possible.
Even the UAE seems ready to reconcile but underlying disputes are likely to persist.
After the Obama and Trump eras, mutual suspicions abound, but Riyadh has several potential approaches to improve relations with an incoming Biden administration.
AGSIW held a briefing on Iraq for the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs with Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman, Hussein Ibish, Ali Alfoneh, and Ambassador Feisal al-Istrabadi.
On November 5, AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion on the future of Gulf-Palestinian relations.
On October 15, AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion on the implications of Iran's weapons agenda.
On September 29, AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion on Gulf interests and involvement in the eastern Mediterranean basin.
While the UAE had a complex range of goals, Bahrain is focused on Iran.
On September 2, AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion examining the UAE-Israel agreement, the role of the United States, and how the agreement will alter regional dynamics.
A number of countries are expected to follow suit, each for its own distinct reasons.
Palestinians are fuming, but the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel all see clear benefits in the normalization of relations between a key Arab state and Israel.
Some Gulf states may take satisfaction in Iran's setbacks, but they are vulnerable to potential retaliation.
Gulf states have much to hope for, and worry about, if President Trump wins reelection.
UAE officials are doing their best to warn Israelis against annexation, but the medium may trump the message.
Gulf states may find plenty to work with to strengthen ties with Washington in a Biden presidency.
On May 26, AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion examining new IRGC leadership and how the killing of Suleimani is likely to change Iran’s grand strategy and Quds Force operations in Iraq and beyond.
Although there are many reasons to believe the U.S.-Saudi partnership can endure, the need for both parties to repair trust has rarely been more urgent.
On April 15, AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion analyzing the future of the U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Iraq.
The Iranian government's network of foreign militia groups represents its primary regional power projection and national security tool.
As long as Turkey is seen as an aspiring hegemon it will face opposition from many neighbors.
AGSIW experts explain what regional trends they’ll be following most closely as the year unfolds.
Responses from Gulf Arab states to Trump's plan have differed, but they all praised U.S. efforts without endorsing the proposal.
Kristin Smith Diwan and Hussein Ibish discuss the role for the Gulf Arab states in de-escalating tensions between Iran and the United States.
On January 23, AGSIW hosted a panel discussion examining the recent crises in Iraq and the fallout from the U.S. airstrike that killed Iran’s Quds Force commander Major General Qassim Suleimani.
GCC states all oppose any escalation with Iran, but it remains unclear if that will help heal other rifts.
On January 8, AGSIW hosted a conversation considering the trends likely to shape the Gulf region in 2020.
Following a U.S. drone strike that killed Iran’s Quds Force chief, Gulf Arab states can help calm tensions.
This paper reviews how Turkish-Gulf Arab relations have developed in recent years, particularly following the end of the main civil war in Syria.
For the fourth consecutive year, AGSIW convened the UAE Security Forum, where U.S., UAE, and regional partners gathered to find creative solutions to some of the region’s most pressing challenges.
Tehran's difficulties, including major unrest at home and in Iraq and Lebanon, could make the Islamic Republic more amenable to a real compromise with its Gulf Arab neighbors.
Iraqi social and economic grievances open possibilities for positive Gulf Arab engagement and investment.
Strikes on Saudi oil facilities are an opportunity to marshal a global coalition to restore deterrence in the Gulf.
AGSIW examines the ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran.
While the Emiratis have their own reasons for outreach to Tehran, Washington and Riyadh may find it useful as well.
Whatever the path out of the current crisis, Gulf Arab states seeking an end to Iranian interference in regional affairs are likely to be disappointed.
Caught in the crossfire already, Gulf Arab countries have an important opportunity to help shape the off-ramp from confrontation.
On May 24, the Trump administration issued a national emergency declaration citing tensions with Iran to bypass congressional opposition to arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.
Gulf countries are getting what they want from the White House, but ties with other parts of the U.S. establishment are fraying.
Saudi Arabia moves to consolidate Arab and Muslim support, anticipating intensified confrontation or diplomacy.
While some urge confrontation, powerful voices of reason emerge.
On May 9, AGSIW hosted a panel discussion examining Turkey's new and more assertive regional role.
Focus on breakaway factions and groups engaged in violence will prove the most pragmatic and effective measure
AGSIW hosted a panel discussion examining the diplomatic, security, and economic issues shaping the growing relationship between the countries of the Gulf and the South Asian subcontinent.
Yemen, Khashoggi, detainees, and nuclear technology are driving a deep-seated congressional backlash against Riyadh.
Rouhani's trip to Iraq and Assad's to Iran show that Tehran and its allies are determined to maintain alliances.
From the establishment of the Turkey-Russia-Iran triumvirate to the ongoing Arab efforts to re-engage with Syria, everything can be traced back to the events of December 2016.
Western cohesion on Iran and Arab-Israeli cooperation both seem stalled as headaches mount for Tehran.
2019 could be a tough year on Capitol Hill for Gulf Arab countries.
With the war over, Arab countries re-engage with the Assad regime to ensure their interests in the future of Syria.
The United Arab Emirates will reopen its embassy in Damascus, and Bahrain and Kuwait are following suit.
Dealing with an unpredictable, exceptionally political, and nonstrategic administration in Washington poses serious problems for all U.S. allies, including those in the Gulf.
For the third consecutive year, AGSIW convened the UAE Security Forum, where U.S., UAE, and regional partners gather to find creative solutions to some of the region’s most pressing challenges.
The conflict in Yemen has exacted a disastrous toll on the country. This paper considers the outside forces in the conflict, seeking to elucidate who they are, what the nature is of their involvement, and what their converging and conflicting interests mean for reconstruction.
Factors including regard for the victim, the nature of the crime, the powerful accusers, and Trump-related anxieties all contribute to the extraordinary impact in Washington of the Khashoggi murder.
AGSIW hosted Raghida Dergham, founder and executive chairman of the Beirut Institute, and Andrew Peek, deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, to analyze developments in U.S. Middle East policy.
The midterm elections may illustrate that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have become too much of a partisan issue in U.S. politics.
AGSIW hosted a briefing on arms sales to Saudi Arabia with DB Des Roches, an associate professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies at the National Defense University.
With Erdogan trying to exploit the Khashoggi affair and Riyadh in damage-control mode, the controversy is inflaming the Saudi-Turkish geopolitical and ideological rivalry.
The disappearance of the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi won't completely upend U.S.-Saudi relations but will almost certainly have a significant negative impact on them.
It’s hard to overstate the regional impact of the rivalry between Iran and several Gulf Arab states—most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—bordering in recent years on enmity.
With the new government, Iraq could be a major arena for those seeking to roll back Iran’s influence in the region.
On September 26, Ali Alfoneh, Bessma Momani, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, and moderator Hussein Ibish discussed the Trump administration's reimposition of sanctions on Iran.
Are the United States and Iran preparing to go to war? The prospect has certainly advanced considerably since Donald Trump became president and, particularly, when he withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent international tour – beginning with contentious meetings in North Korea and ending at the controversial NATO summit in Brussels – included a less dramatic but nonetheless very important stop in Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates.
On June 28, AGSIW hosted a public panel discussion on GCC-Horn of Africa relations.
Saudi Arabia’s accelerating campaign to revive its influence in Iraq may have been significantly bolstered by the results of the May 12 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
On May 23, AGSIW hosted a panel discussion exploring the implications of major developments for the Gulf Arab countries and the rest of the region.
President Donald J. Trump’s announcement that the United States is “withdrawing” from the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was greeted with considerable enthusiasm by many Gulf Arab leaders.
Will Donald Trump walk away from the Iran nuclear deal, as he has threatened, on May 12?
One of the most important and least understood aspects of Saudi Arabia’s evolving proactive foreign and regional policy is its campaign of diplomatic and political outreach in Iraq.
The White House is resurrecting the idea of an Arab expeditionary force – a concept that, for decades, has surfaced periodically in Middle Eastern discourse only to quickly evaporate and then suddenly re-emerge.
After much argument and delay, American, British and French military strikes against Syrian regime targets were finally begun on Saturday morning.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman raised many eyebrows with recent comments that seemed unusually conciliatory toward Israel.
When an entire people and many of their political leaders conclude they have nothing left to lose, all hell can break loose.
And then there was one “grown-up” left in the Trump White House.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will begin his first visit to the United States as presumptive heir to the throne; it comes at a crucial time, with Saudi social and political changes and economic reform gaining steam and Trump administration policies toward Iran growing more confrontational.
The Trump administration emphasizes its differences with its predecessors, particularly the Obama administration, and claims to be pursuing radically different policies across the board.
By most objective metrics, U.S. hard power (military), soft power (scientific, cultural, and humanitarian), and “sticky” power (economic) in the Middle East is largely unchanged from four or eight years ago.
The once closely linked and relatively coherent struggle inside Syria has fragmented into a series of intense, but highly localized, battles, which are being watched warily by regional powers because of the significant impact the outcomes are likely to have on the regional strategic landscape.
When Donald J. Trump was elected president of the United States just over a year ago, Washington’s Gulf Arab allies were generally optimistic.
Whatever domestic calculations prompted President Donald J. Trump to announce on December 6 that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and will move its embassy there from Tel Aviv.
Call it shock and awe. Call it a purge. Call it a clean sweep.
The resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri almost certainly signals the determination of Saudi Arabia and its allies to intensify their regional confrontation with Iran and its clients in Lebanon and beyond.
Over the past year, there has been a great deal of speculation about the potential for improved relations between Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf region, and Israel, largely based on a shared perception of the threat from Iran and the need for a more stable regional status quo.
After the announcement of Donald Trump’s “new Iran strategy” everyone, both those panicked and elated, need to take a deep breath.
On October 12, rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas agreed to a national reconciliation pact that began to sketch out a new political arrangement that could lead to far-reaching changes in Gaza with broad, regional implications.
The biggest deliverable arising from Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz’s visit to Russia is almost certainly Riyadh’s announced intention to purchase a range of Russian weapons systems, notably S-400 surface-to-air missiles.
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities in Iraq have reported a predictably huge “yes” vote, over 90 percent, in the nonbinding referendum on Kurdish independence that was held September 25.
President Donald J. Trump has reportedly instructed his national security and intelligence staff to find a rationale for declaring Iran noncompliant with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement Tehran reached in 2015 with the P5+1, the five permanent U.N.
As the crisis regarding Qatar’s relations with four other key Arab countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt – enters its second month, the recent meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo appears to offer a new framework to resolve the standoff.
As the confrontation between the Arab coalition and Qatar nears the one-month mark, with Doha insisting it intends to reject the 13 demands placed before it, it’s becoming increasingly clear that if there is to be any kind of reconciliation it will be brokered by Washington.
On June 20, a U.S. State Department spokesperson announced what seemed to be a crucial shift in the U.S.
The world seems startled by the seemingly sudden rift between key Arab states and Qatar.
The past week has witnessed an unprecedented escalation of tensions among the Gulf Cooperation Council states, culminating with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain severing ties with Qatar.
Donald Trump flew into sunny Saudi Arabia pursued by some of the darkest clouds looming over Washington in decades.
U.S. President Donald J. Trump leaves Washington on Friday for his first overseas trip, under a mounting cloud of domestic controversy, beginning with a crucial visit to Saudi Arabia.
President Trump's visit to the region raises the question of whether a definitive Trump administration Middle East policy may be starting to take shape
Senior Emirati officials will meet US president Donald Trump this month, with much to discuss.
Washington faces a crucial decision on Syria in the coming weeks, with massive implications for its entire Middle East agenda.
The continuing renovation of relations between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies with Washington reached a new level this week, moving from the aspirational towards practical application.
The budding efforts between the Gulf Arab states and Iran to develop a process of détente and ease tensions are, in equal measure, important, welcome, and fragile.
After a virtually unbroken string of blunders since his inauguration, Donald Trump finally got a major policy decision right.
Confronted with serious challenges but also blessed with remarkable assets, the United Arab Emirates has developed a distinctive national security strategy.
The honeymoon between the Trump administration and the Gulf Arab countries is a welcome respite after years of mutual doubts and recriminations.
Moscow increasingly aspires to play the role of mediator in the Middle East, but how seriously should we take this? Russia, along with Turkey and Iran, has been attempting to mediate between the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and some of its opponents in negotiations in the Kazakh capital, Astana, and in Geneva.
Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz is on the first leg of an unprecedented trip to several key countries in East Asia, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, China, Japan, and the Maldives.
The administration of President Donald J. Trump has suggested that one of its foreign policy goals may be to attempt to persuade Russia to distance itself from Iran and even cooperate with the United States against Tehran.
The GCC countries view Turkey as an indispensable Sunni ally and counterweight to Iran, but a difficult, and at times unreliable, partner.
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah Khaled al-Sabah’s visit to Tehran on January 25 was officially billed as a bilateral meeting, but also widely reported to have included a broader outreach to Iran by Kuwait’s partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Iran’s major regional rival, Saudi Arabia.
AGSIW scholars examine statements made by some of the president’s key Cabinet nominees during their confirmation hearings for clues to the new administration’s likely policies on the issues of most pressing interest to the Gulf Arab states.
Relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia – a key feature of the Middle Eastern political landscape and a pillar of Arab security – took another body blow on January 16 when Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court rejected Cairo’s plan to transfer control over two uninhabited, but strategically located, Red Sea islands to Riyadh.
New Lebanese President Michel Aoun visited Saudi Arabia on January 9 in an effort to heal a rift that has been damaging to both countries’ interests but, until now, did not seem readily resolvable.
The biggest fault line potentially facing the incoming Trump administration in the United States has become clear: relations with Russia.
The sudden flurry of diplomatic activity on issues regarding Israel and the Palestinians has been full of high-minded, and entirely correct, principles.
Egypt and the GCC countries have a complex, but indispensable, diplomatic, military, and political partnership in the contemporary world.
Amid the crazy quilt of billionaires, Republican insiders and retired generals who are populating president-elect Donald J Trump’s emerging cabinet, the Gulf states and other US Middle East allies are among the few outside of his core supporters with something real to cheer about already: his choice for secretary of defence, retired Gen James Mattis.
Washington’s relations with its Gulf Arab partners have been strained in recent years, particularly because of U.S.
The unfolding tragedy in Aleppo is not only a humanitarian and moral disaster, but it is a political calamity as well.
The death of Muhammad Sorour at age 80 in Qatar has gone almost entirely unremarked upon in the West, but arguably signals the end of an era for Sunni Muslim religious extremism.
Like millions of other Americans, I watched Tuesday night’s election results first with cautious optimism, then creeping foreboding, followed by mounting alarm giving way, ultimately, to utter horror.
Call it an “American intifada”. The election of Donald Trump was a virtual rebellion by the rural and suburban lower-middle class against the educated urbanites who usually define American culture and society.
Like most of the rest of the world, including the U.S.
In these pages last month, I outlined a number of reasons why the Gulf states should be cautiously optimistic about US foreign policy in a Hillary Clinton administration, given that the Democratic nominee is extremely likely to become the next president.
Few outside forces that are not directly involved in the conflict in Iraq have more at stake in the outcome of the battle over Mosul than Gulf Arab countries.
With less than three weeks to go before the American presidential election, virtually all credible observers believe that Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton is now assured of victory.
The U.S. Congress’ swift and decisive override last week of President Barack Obama’s veto of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) may have been momentarily euphoric for the bill’s supporters.
Anger in some parts of the Arabian Gulf over a new US law, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (Jasta), is understandable.
A showdown on Capitol Hill over what is potentially one of the most far-reaching and consequential pieces of foreign policy legislation in many years was set up on Friday, September 23, when U.S.
The recent adoption by overwhelming majorities in both the U.S.
The battle for Aleppo could be a turning point in Syria’s civil war — not simply because it may prove a decisive moment in the struggle between the government and the opposition, but because the leadership of the rebel forces is at stake.
A Muslim American is the person “most responsible for keeping America safe since the Sept.
The appalling massacre on Bastille Day in Nice, France – in which at least 84 people were killed by a French-Tunisian man driving a 19-ton refrigerated truck and armed with an automatic pistol – capped off several weeks of virtually unprecedented terrorist carnage around the world.
On Friday night, the world watched the collapse of what seems an exceptionally ill-conceived and poorly planned coup attempt in Turkey.
The recent visit to Washington, New York and Silicon Valley by Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, might, like most diplomatic missions, quickly faded into irrelevance.
The very least that the Gulf states can consider acceptable as an outcome to the Syrian conflict is the limitation of Iran’s ambitions in the Arab world and the regional containment of Tehran.
On April 6, 1971, 20 United States foreign service officers led by the consul general in Dhaka, Archer Blood, issued the first formal telegram of dissent in the history of the state department.
“Islamism is dead!” announced Said Ferjani, a leader of the progressive wing of Ennahda, Tunisia’s main Islamist party, as we drank coffee in a hotel cafe here last month.
The Arab Peace Initiative (API) is receiving a great deal of attention these days, primarily from Israel, but also from Egypt, the Gulf states, and others.
One of the key features of late Obama-era American foreign policy is the dominant mythology that all American – and, by extension, any western – military intervention in the Middle East is doomed to failure.
The battle to define the policy legacy of any two-term American presidency usually emerges as the election for a successor begins in earnest.
The American presidential election will almost certainly be between former secretary of state Hillary Clinton and real estate mogul Donald Trump.
This post is the second in a series by AGSIW senior resident scholars on the foreign policy implications of the 2016 U.S.
In Levantine landscapes, history is piled high.
Marshall McLuhan’s famous observation that sometimes “the medium is the message” perfectly describes the substance of last week’s US-GCC summit.
When President Barack Obama visits Saudi Arabia on April 20-21 and meets with Gulf Cooperation Council leaders, he will be tackling one of the most important, but deeply strained, U.S.
The US-GCC summit meeting in Saudi Arabia next Thursday should prove an important milestone in the relationship, especially since it is intended to set the precedent of an annual head- of-state level summit into the foreseeable future.
My visit to the UAE last week strongly reinforced for me that negative misperceptions about Gulf relations with the United States, which in fact remain very strong, are deeply felt and widespread.
The announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the “main part” of his country’s military forces that have intervened in Syria since late September 2015 will begin withdrawing soon may prove less dramatic in practice than many hope or suspect.
Jeffrey Goldberg’s new article in The Atlantic comes close to realising the familiar cliché about journalism being a “first draft of history”.
One can readily understand why Saudi Arabia suspended a $3 billion (Dh11bn) aid package for the Lebanese Armed Forces to purchase French weapons, and cancelled outright an additional $1 billion in support for Lebanese internal security.
Saudi Arabia’s decision to suspend a major military aid package to Lebanon – $3 billion earmarked for the purchase of French weapons – and to revoke another $1 billion pledged to support Lebanon’s internal security services, is an unexpected and dramatic change of policy toward a politically crucial Arab country.
Tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia are becoming a disturbingly prominent feature of political discourse in the two countries.
The closing of Al Jazeera America, expected in April, is a sad conclusion to a project that was by turns uplifting and inspiring as well as troubling and depressing.
Is Saudi Arabia really preparing to send ground troops into Syria? When Brigadier General Ahmed al-Asiri said on February 4 that Riyadh was willing to contribute ground troops or special forces to any international initiative to combat ISIL in Syria, most observers dismissed the idea.
To no one’s surprise, and certainly not everyone’s disappointment, the latest round of peace talks on Syria this week in Geneva collapsed almost before it began.
The January 2 execution by Saudi Arabia of 47 people on terrorism charges and the backlash it provoked have sent shockwaves through the diplomatic and political landscape of the Middle East.
Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, 2015 was a decisive year and even a turning point on several of the most pressing issues facing the Middle East.
Donald J. Trump’s scandalous proposal that the United States bar entry to all Muslims — though he later clarified his view that American citizens and a few others might be allowed in — raises two fundamental but largely unaddressed questions: Who and what is a “Muslim”? Mr.
The announcement on Tuesday that Saudi Arabia has taken the initiative to form a 34-member “Islamic military alliance” is, in theory at least, one of the most dramatic international counterterrorism moves in many years.
The meeting of Syrian opposition groups in Saudi Arabia last week was neither an unqualified success nor, as some claim, a “fiasco”.
The meeting of Syrian rebel groups in Saudi Arabia, beginning today and running through December 10, marks a major step forward in efforts to create a coherent political front for the opposition as international mediation efforts gain steam.
A growing trope in mainstream Western analysis, which is also present in some parts of Arab and Muslim discourse, casts the kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the political and moral equivalent of the terrorist group ISIL (also known as ISIS, the “Islamic State,” and Daesh).
From the outset, sceptical voices, especially in the West, rushed to deem the Arab intervention in Yemen – led by Saudi Arabia with support from the UAE – a “quagmire”.
The appalling terrorist attacks in Paris by ISIL that killed at least 120 people have drawn strong condemnation from the international community as a whole, including the Arab Gulf states and their leaders.
The reaction of the Arab Gulf states to Russia’s sudden and dramatic escalation in Syria is moving beyond rhetoric and into actions.
On Friday the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the National Dialogue Quartet in Tunisia, a group of organisations that played a critical role in guiding the country towards stability with good governance and accountability.
The civil conflict in Syria has been a major concern for many Gulf Arab states since the outbreak of the uprising against the Baathist dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad over four years ago.
WASHINGTON — After more than two years of perceived slights and supposed snubs, the new contours of a revitalized but evolving partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia are beginning to take shape.
Despite the heterogeneity of interests and perspectives among the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they share a broad consensus on the nuclear deal agreed to by major powers and Iran.
The visit of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz to Washington last week was intended by both sides to reinforce the Saudi-U.S.
The Arab intervention in Yemen has reached a critical point.
On August 3, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry joined a meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Doha after which the Arab Gulf states unanimously and publicly endorsed the international nuclear agreement with Iran.
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s public endorsement of the nuclear agreement with Iran is a smart move, but it’s neither a blank cheque for Washington nor the last word from the Gulf states on the international community’s relationship with Tehran.
As expected, the Iran nuclear deal is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Middle East. This article originally appeared in The National.
WASHINGTON — If the Iran nuclear deal was an earthquake shaking the Middle East’s strategic landscape, one of the most dramatic aftershocks was the surprising arrival last month in Saudi Arabia of a high-level delegation from Hamas.
A huge political battle is looming in Washington over the nuclear agreement with Iran.
The strategic impact in the Gulf region of the nuclear agreement with Iran will hinge on the perceptions of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as to whether or not it helps to curb Iranian “adventurism” and, especially, its support for destabilizing activities in the region.
The brinkmanship exhibited at the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5 +1 international consortium is breathtaking, and suggests, for the first time in several months, the actual possibility of failure.
With the international negotiations with Iran entering their final stage, all parties are reading from the same script in terms of managing expectations.
DOHA, Qatar — The old joke among foreign policy wonks began thus: After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the world was surprised to discover that it still had two superpowers: the United States and … Kuwait.
ISIL’s two suicide bomb attacks against Shiite mosques in eastern Saudi Arabia in the past week are, perhaps, even more disturbing than its recent territorial gains in Iraq and Syria.
Following several years of strained relations, the U.S.- GCC summit provided the parties with a crucial opportunity to reset their partnership.
It may not have been a massive breakthrough, but in defiance of most predictions, last week’s summit meeting between American president Barack Obama and leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries proved a significant success.
At this week’s summit at Camp David, both American and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders will be genuinely hoping for a reset in their recently frayed relations.
The 5th Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Consultative Summit held yesterday in Saudi Arabia is one of the most significant and noteworthy ever.
WASHINGTON — When, at its March summit meeting, the Arab League announced that it intended to create a unified command for a joint Arab military force, eyes rolled.
Is the United States really willing to use military action to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? Under Barack Obama that has been the oft-repeated US policy, but several developments allowed the question to fade into the background.
King Salman’s recent shakeup of the highest levels of government in Saudi Arabia has several clear and important themes.
Skepticism is helpful. Cynicism isn’t.
The framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program achieved by the U.S.-led P5+1 international coalition in many ways goes further, and is significantly more detailed, than most observers had considered possible.
